By the 1990s, economic failure and rural neglect in many countries were attributed to excessive centralization and top-down approaches.  While Community-driven Development (CDD) emerged as a response to this concern, it is not panacea nor a one-size fits all and many factors contribute to its success or failure. The centralization-decentralization dilemma remains a struggle about power and the perspective that there is a finite amount of economic and social resources.  The following touches upon what CDD is and its history, when and why it works, and the challenges surrounding the approach.

Definition

Community driven development (CDD) is a phrase that has had different meanings for different development agencies, ranging from consultation to empowerment (see Table 1 below).  CDD is an approach that emphasizes community control over planning decisions and investment resources.  CDD programs evolved out of an attempt to reverse traditional  “top-down”  service delivery  by  letting  communities  identify  and implement small-scale investments among several sectors. CDDs vary enormously, depending on country  contexts, government champions, and project task teams but the approach has been typically (although not always) used in one or the other of three contexts:

• situations of fragility and/or post-conflict;

• financial and economic crises; or

• in middle-income countries where government bureaucracy and local administrations have failed to meet the needs of the poor and excluded.

The purpose of participatory programs is to enhance the involvement of the poor and the marginalized in community-led decision-making bodies to give citizens greater say in decisions that affect their lives. Community-driven development refers to projects in which communities, functioning outside a formal system of government, are given funds that they manage to implement interventions they have identified (Mansuri and Rao, 2013).

Devolving resources to communities required the development of new disbursement, procurement, and accountability mechanisms. In this respect, CDD by definition must rely on community empowerment to plan and execute sub-projects according to the community-defined priorities. Along this continuum,  Local and community driven development (LCDD) is not a project; it is an approach that aims to empower both communities and local governments with the resources and authority to use them flexibly, thus taking control of their development.  Empowering means the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives. It means giving people access to voice and information, greater social inclusion and participation, greater accountability, and organizational strength (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector, 2010).

Table 1  Timeline of Development Approaches

Indicator	19050s	1960s	1970s-1980s	1990s	2000	2005
Development approach	Centralized, Decentralized	Sectoral, technology-led, green revolution, irrigation development	Special area or target group, ADP, and IRDP, NGOs and private sector	CBD, SF and SAP	CDD	LCDD
Community Involvement	Minimal ⇾	Consultation ⇾	Participation   ⟶⟶⟶⟶⟶		Empowerment

Source: Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, and Spector, 2010; and this author’s additions.

Legend:  ADP: area development program; IRDP: integrated rural development program; NGO: nongovernmental organization; CBD: community-based development; SF: social fund; SAP, social action program; CDD, community driven development; LCDD: local and community driven development.

CDD by the Numbers over time.  During Wolfensohn’s presidency 1995 to 2005, Mr. Wolfensohn was personally convinced that community decentralized approaches yielded better outcomes than top-down centralized.  He ordered a review of Bank lending experience and created a Bank-wide CDD working group to come up with clear definitions of CDD approaches and to review the portfolio of CDD lending.  Between FY 2000 and FY 2008, $16 billion was lent for 637 operations that contained elements of the CDD approach, or about 9 percent of total lending of the World Bank Group. For IDA lending, this percentage was higher about 16 percent.  According to a World Bank 2005 review entitled The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community Based and -Driven Development, during 1989 to 2003, the share of Bank projects with CDD components grew to 25 percent.  Over time, the results of social funds and CDD operations had better satisfactory outcomes and quality of supervision than Bank-wide averages.   In Wong, 2012, the paper states that the World Bank has supported 400 CDD projects in 94 countries, valued at almost $30 billion.  In Mansuri and Rao, 2013, the paper states that over the past decade, the World Bank has allocated almost $85 billion to local participatory development.

How do CDDs figure into the World Bank organization?  Key staff using or analysing the CDD approach work at the center of the World  Bank in the Social Development Department, Social Development Network created in approximately 1997.  Most Task Team Leaders who take CDD projects to the World Bank Board of Directors and are in charge of their implementation, disbursement and supervision are in the Human Development or Social Sector Divisions of Six Country Regions throughout the Bank, which include: Africa, East Asia and Pacific, European and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia (not all regions have CDD projects).

Conceptual Framework for CDD.  Development policy that uses participatory processes needs to be informed by a thoughtful diagnosis of potential civil society failures, so that policy makers can clearly understand the tradeoffs involved in devolving decisions to local communities and can identify potential ways of repairing such failures.  Market and government failures are now reasonably well understood. Policy makers are less likely to assume markets will work perfectly or that governments can provide effective solutions to market failures. The policy literature is rife with solutions to market and government failures that assume that groups of people—village communities, urban neighborhood associations, school councils, water user groups—will always work toward the common interest.  Rarely is much thought given to the possibility of “civil society failure.” Organizing groups of people to solve market and government failures is itself subject to problems of coordination, asymmetric information, and pervasive inequality.  Civil society failure at the local level can be thought of as a situation in which groups that live in geographic proximity are unable to act collectively to reach a feasible and preferable outcome. It includes coordinated actions that are inefficient—or efficient but welfare reducing on average. (Mansuri and Rao, 2013)

The Internal Evaluation Group (IEG) is charged with evaluating the activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA) projects of the World Bank).  In 2005, it undertook an evaluation of social funds—one of the early types of community-driven development—and looked at the period from fiscal 1987 to fiscal 2000 and at the results available for the 98 social funds in 58 countries worth a total of $3.5 billion.  The evaluation found that 96 percent of closed  social funds had satisfactory outcomes against 71 percent for all Bank projects.  Social Funds worked especially well in post-conflict situations such as Cambodia and Nicaragua. IEG rated institutional development as substantial in 65 percent of projects (better than 36 percent for all Bank projects). Social funds demonstrated that they could help build the capacity of local governments, communities, and NGOs.  Their effectiveness was attributed to their autonomy from the line ministries of central governments.  Sustainability is likely for only 43 percent of projects against 51 percent for all Bank projects.

The design of CDD programs has evolved over the last two decades, with varying levels of decision-making authority (Wong, 2012).  Thinking of local development policy as occurring at the intersection of market, government, and civil society failures increases appreciation of context. Such interactions are conditioned by culture, politics, and social structure, and vary from place to place. A policy that works in one country, or even one municipality, may fail in another.   Factors to consider:

Country’s political system and context matter a great deal.  In democracies, electoral incentives shape participatory interventions.  Stable democracies allow stable trajectories of decentralization.  They have an affinity for empowered participation functioning in the presence of strong civic institutions.  At the national level, nationalist ideologies—the manner in which the state (colonial and postcolonial) has created and propagated identity—can create symbolic public goods that facilitate collective action.

History matters: Policy and  institutional reform—education systems, the judiciary, the media, and efforts at social inclusion—influence government responsiveness to civic mobilization.  Some countries have a long history of organic civic participation, developed in the struggles for independence from colonial rule or against the rule of entrenched elites. Such social movements have given legitimacy to civic activists and created a culture that facilitates civic mobilization. A history of organic participation creates a community of peer educator and an enabling environment within which social entrepreneurs can spark participatory innovations.

Social, economic, demographic, and cultural contexts matter: The nature and extent of social and economic inequality and the composition and diversity of groups affect induced and organic participation. Inequality and heterogeneity affect the cultures and norms of cooperation that evolve within a community. These norms have a bearing on collective action and on the role of local leaders.

Geography matters. Remoteness from more developed areas, difficult terrain, and harsh weather conditions can increase vulnerability, leading to weaker development outcomes. Both social heterogeneity and geography have a bearing on the local cooperative infrastructure—the community’s capacity for collective action.  If a village has a long history of successfully managing common property resources, that capacity can be drawn upon.

Lessons for success include:

• Strong political leadership to decentralization and empowerment is essential;

• Committed country leader and donors need to be opportunists, seizing occasions;

• Successful scale-ups put money in the hands of communities to harness their latent capacity through learning-by-doing, supplemented by capacity building;

• Successful scale-ups must have sound technical design (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, Spector, 2010)

Local participation tends to work well when projects are based on well-thought out designs, facilitated by a responsive center, adequately and sustainably funded, and conditioned by a culture of learning by doing and where projects ensure that:

• Structures allow for flexible, long-term engagement;

• Design and impact evaluations are informed by political, social, and economic analysis;

• Monitoring, using cost-effective tools for reporting, is a priority;

• Facilitator feedback, as well as participatory monitoring and redress systems, are created; and

• Honest feedback where failure is tolerated and innovation can take place.  (Mansuri and Rao 2013)

Cautionary lessons from history:

• While empowering civic groups may lead to good outcomes, it is not clear that inducing civic empowerment is always superior to a market-based strategy or a strategy that strengthens the role of central bureaucrats. Policy makers need to keep this in mind as they consider how to harness the power of communities;  

• CDD projects can be driven by sector specialists who do not necessarily see the institutional, social, and economic policy environment;

• Governments are not always willing to devolve resources, power, or responsibility to communities or local governments.

• The decision-making black box.  Impact evaluations tend to focus on outcomes and outputs, and communities expressed satisfaction with the programs and services in general but understanding the decision-making process in the allocation of resources and whether or not they are participatory or are they reinforcing established patronage systems has not been determined.  Why are some subprojects chosen and not others?  How to traditional power holders in the community view these CDD programs and their mechanisms for decision making?

• Sustainability and social capital building and governance spillover requires training and capacity building of reform-minded local leaders to improve community ownership and buy-in.  Scaling-up can take as long as 15 years requiring a long-term commitment from donors, governments, and community leaders.

• Financing can be provided through multi sectoral, ministry channels, block grants, district level resources, independent auditors/corruption.  Several CDD programs allocate community block grant amounts per village, municipality or area.  The grant amounts are determined by criteria, such as level of poverty, remoteness, number of villages per municipality, and/or population.  Often, later stages of CDD programs are supplemented with additional financing (AF) to keep programs sustainable.

Scaling-up feeds off of this idea of success.  The core philosophical underpinning of well-functioning, successful CDD are the values, elements, overall processes, and goals to adapt to and within the local context without undermining the universal philosophical underpinnings.

Few Scaling-up successes because:

• The institutional setting may be hostile to CDD, vested interests, central government, competing NGOs.  Laws and regulations may not allow money to be disbursed directly to communities.  Central government may not allow local governments or communities provide their own education and/or primary health or to levy user fees or taxes.The social environment may deprive wom
• Minorities of voice—Ethnic, religious and class conflict may undermine real participation by all.
• Some CDD islands of success are not replicable because like many “boutiques,” they are too costly for the masses.   Where political resistance is strong, scaling up should not be attempted as the risks are too high.
• Participatory interventions work best when they are supported by a responsive state.

Impact Evaluations

There are a minuscule number of CDDs that have benefited from a rigorous impact evaluation.  Out of 400 active CDD programs and 25 years of implementation, there are only 17 or so impact evaluations available at this point.  Technical expertise is one reason as they must be designed at the outset of the project implementation and this expertise is often lacking in local contexts.  More research and resources are needed to learn from the world’s experience from CDDs to date.

Bibliography

Hans Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt, Jacomina P. and Stephen Spector, 2010, Local and Community Driven Development: Moving to Scale in Theory and Practice, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Mansuri, G. and V. Rao, 2013.  Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?
Wong, Susan, What Have Been the Impacts of World Bank Community-Driven Development Programs?, 2012. CDD Impact Evaluation Review and Operational and Research Implications, The Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network, Washington, DC: World Bank.

On April 16, 2015, The Hunger Project organized a panel discussion as part of the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings. In this critical year for finalizing the Sustainable Development Goals, five organizations came together to present broad perspectives and specific methods for empowering communities to take charge of their own development.

[youtube=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_HyBteyoLM]

In part 1 – John Coonrod, executive vice president of The Hunger Project set the context of the discussion and introduced Mirza Jahani, CEO of the Aga Khan Foundation who presents a broad overview of the philosophy and approach, and its importance.

[youtube=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fznt1L6wvFQ]

In part 2, Sarah Ford, Partnership and Capacity Strengthening Director, describes how the approach of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) emerges from Catholic Social Teaching.

[youtube=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXGZx8R9NIA]

In part 3, Emily Janoch, Knowledge and Learning Advisor, describes the methodologies utilized by CARE.

[youtube=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnbpX2WbVCg]

In part 4, Ritu Sharma, co-founder of Women Thrive World Wide and author of the book Teach a Woman to Fish.

At the 2014 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF, President Jim Yong Kim led world leaders in forging a far-more urgent and specific consensus on what to do to halt the Ebola epidemic in the three affected countries, put in place a sustainable public health care system in those countries, and kick-start their now-stalled but recently very dynamic and high-growth economies.

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The presidents of the three affected countries – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea – all participated in the conference and – in their very brief statements – responded to the earlier recommendation of Jim Kim: that they not focus on the economics or on what seems political feasible – instead, they should know precisely what is need to bring the highest standard of treatment to all those affected. The presidents did so, with great specificity, and it appeared that the donors are ready to ensure it happens.

I strongly recommend you watch this video—not only for the important commitments made by agencies and governments—but as a one of the best examples I’ve ever witnessed of the kind of meetings we need to have on a full range of issues, at every level of society.

On May 7, 2014 the mighty THP-DC team attended a discussion by the NYU professor and author William Easterly and the World Bank Chief Economist for the MENA region Shanta Devarajan (former colleagues). The topic was Easterly’s new book The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor.

Unlike his previous books, this book is not a critique of aid per se, and – as he promises – it does not tell donor agencies what they should or should not do. Rather, he aims for a Copernican Revolution which puts poor people and their rights at the center of development policy.

Easterly argued that economists have inaccurately attributed short-term economic growth to autocratic leaders, when “the autocrats are the problem, not the solution.” He asserts, like Sen, that economic growth comes from expansions in people’s economic and political rights. And he feels that when economists do this, they are undermining the rights of the poor — either directly (as described in several heartbreaking case studies) or indirectly, by simply “siding” with the autocrats and staying silent about people’s struggles for their rights.

The Bank Articles of Agreement state (10) “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned.” Given that all nations formally ascribe to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, why this would prevent the Bank from advocating a Rights-Based approach to development. Easterly felt this was motivated more by the foreign policy of the US and other donors than by Bank rules – that the US finds that “autocrats make better allies than democrats” in the war on terror and other foreign policy objectives, and therefore wishes not to offend them.

Easterly commented that there are always three questions that arise: India, China and What-to-Do, The first two were discussed in detail in his conversation with Devarajan. He emphasized that democracy is not simply about majority elections, but about the protection of the rights of the powerless, and in this regard India is not successful. He stated that “India is now growing as a whole, just some states in the South of India are growing.” He described the “Tyranny of the Question What-to-Do” – that development discourse is suppressed to only those ideas that can lead to an actionable recommendation in five minutes.

At the end, an audience member reminded him of Question 3: China. Easterly stated that China was a perfect example. Deng Xiaoping is often given credit for the reforms that led to China’s economic growth. But he was forced into that change, Easterly stated, by bottom-up action by the farmers themselves, who literally bribed officials to give them access to private plots, and he cited the book by Kate Xiao Zhou, How The Farmers Changed China.